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 2 
Introduction 
 
 The importance of understanding the dreadful 9/11 attack cannot be overestimated. Krebs [Krebs 
2002], has made a useful contribution using social network theory whilst  Dombrowski and Carley 
[Dombrowski 2002] have developed a useful Bayesian technique for combining sparse and maybe 
unreliable informant information to build up a picture of  a terrorist network. The starting point for the 
present analysis is the same Sydney Morning Herald article [Sydney 2001] that  Valdis Krebs used in 
developing his now famous network analysis of the 9/11 Hijackers.  However our analysis leads in a 
different, and complementary, direction to that uncovered by Krebs and Dombrowski. While the analysis 
we develop here does not provide predictive certainty, it does lead to some useful insights into the thinking, 
planning and organization of the terrorist networks involved in some of the worst al-Qa‘ida attacks, in 
particular 9/11. 
 We approach the problem of uncovering and analyzing the structure of the 9/11 terrorist network 
through an exploration of the traces which any organization must inevitably leave after conducting a 
complex terrorist operation.   We use these traces to develop a set of conclusions which are confirmed by 
other external data. This first round of analysis in turn forms the basis of subsequent insights and allows us 
to ask some key definitional questions. In addition to our own line of argument, we also provide confirming 
evidence for a number of our assumptions in external sources.  This data supports both our methodology 
and the conclusions which we draw.  The bulk of this evidence is simply drawn from after-the-fact public 
data on the 9/11 attack as well as other al-Qa‘ida terrorist operations (Figure 1-below): 
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The Social Network Approach 
 
 The analysis developed here is worked up from the same publicly available data that Krebs [Krebs 
2002] initially used from the Sydney Morning Herald [Sydney 2001], just fifteen days after the attack. 
Krebs uses this data as the start of a social network analysis.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Valdis Krebs Social Network Diagram of the 9/11 Hijacker Network 
 
 
 While Krebs‘ work represents a landmark achievement in understanding terrorist networks, we need to 
keep in mind that the 9/11 terrorist network was not a normal social network.  Rather, it was formally 
designed for a special purpose. That is, it was firstly designed to carry out a particular plan, and secondly to 
conceal that plan and those involved in it till after the plan had been executed. However the attacks were 
organized and organisation implies order and order leaves traces. We have therefore re-analysed the data 
using attribute mapping to find what traces of organizational order show.  
 4 
Basic Symmetries in the 9/11 Network 
 
 Organisational order frequently appears in one of two distinct ways, as pattern (symmetry of structure) 
[Prigogine 1980, Simon 1957] and hierarchy (or cardinality) and both of these play a part in our enquiry.  
In this context, order tends to imply organisation, and frequently the reverse is also true, that organisation 
implies some order. If we throw a pair of dice once and they come up with a six and a one we may well 
think that this was the luck of the throw. If we repeat the throw a number of times and they keep on coming 
up with a six and a one we would presume that the dice are biased and the bias is acting as an ‗organising‘ 
force pushing away from a true, random distribution towards a more ordered one consisting of mainly sixes 
and ones, and these become the signature of the bias.  
 We could also make inferences about the motivation for biasing the dice, particularly if you were at a 
craps table at the time! The process that we will go through in the following analysis is similar. We start 
with the ‗assumption‘ that the 9/11 attacks were a single organized attack. And then we look for the traces 
of the order this implies. The nature of the order, and the breaks in it, will give us clues to the thinking, 
planning and capabilities of those involved in the operation. When we see signals with the same signature 
in other al-Qa‘ida attacks it helps to justify the inferences that we make about the nature of the thinking and 
planning involved.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Symmetries and redundancies in the training of the 9/11 Hijackers
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Appendix One:  Goodyear vs. Michelin – Offensive Counter Strategy  
Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad – Harvard Business Review, July-August 19851 
 
 As a starting point, let‘s take a look at what drives global competition.  It begins with a sequence of 
competitive action and reaction: 
 
•  An aggressive competitor decides to use the cash flow generated in its home market to subsidize an 
attack on markets of domestically oriented foreign competitors. 
•  The defensive competitor then retaliates—not in its home market, where the attack was staged—but 
in foreign markets where the aggressor company is most vulnerable. 
 
 As an example, consider the contest between Goodyear and Michelin.  By today‘s definitions, the tire 
industry is not global.  Most tire companies manufacture and distribute for the local market.  Yet Michelin, 
Goodyear and Firestone became locked in a fiercely competitive—and very global battle. 
 In the early 1970‘s, Michelin used its strong European profit base to attack Goodyear‘s American 
home market.  Goodyear could fight back in the United States by reducing prices, increasing advertising, or 
offering dealers better margins.  But because Michelin would expose only a small amount of its worldwide 
business in the United States, it had little to lose and much to gain.  Goodyear, on the other hand, would 
sacrifice margins in its largest market. 
 Goodyear ultimately struck back in Europe, throwing a wrench in Michelin‘s money machine.  
Goodyear was proposing a hostage trade.  Michelin‘s long-term goals and resources allowed it to push 
ahead in the United States.  But at least Goodyear slowed down the pace of Michelin‘s attack and forced it 
to recalculate the cost of market share gains in the United States.  Goodyear‘s strategy recognized the 
international scope of competition and parried Michelin‘s thrust. 
  Manufacturers have played out this pattern of cross-subsidization and international retaliation in the 
chemical, auto, aircraft engine and computer industries.  In each case, international cash flows, scale 
economies or homogenous markets, finally determined whether competition was global or national.  The 
Goodyear vs. Michelin case helps to distinguish among: 
 
 •  Global competition, which occurs when companies cross-subsidize national market  share battles in 
 pursuit of global brand and distribution positions. 
 •  Global businesses, in which the minimum volume required for cost efficiency is not 
 available in the company‘s home market. 
 •  Global companies, which have distribution systems in key foreign markets that enable cross-
 subsidization, international retaliation, and world scale volume. 
 
 The analogies to Al-Qaeda here should be obvious to the reader.  In many ways the “battle for 
hearts and minds” is very similar to commercial battle for market share.  One aspect of this which policy 
makers would be wise to heed comes from Michael Porter’s “Cost-Focus” matrix, which is used to 
differentiate between high value added specialty or niche-market products, low value added mass 
produced products (both of which represent successful strategies) and low value added/high cost 
companies and industries (Porter uses the garment business in New York as his example) with the 
occasional low cost/high value added corporation like Microsoft which earns extraordinary returns 
(which could be argued is a consequence of Microsoft’s monopoly position with respect to many 
computing goods and services)
2
.  However, as the following appendix, excerpted from a longer RAND 
corporation report shows, the analogies are not just conceptual metaphors, but correspond to a 
“learning organization” with flexible structure. 
                                               
1
 Excerpted from Hamel, Gary and Prahalad, C.K. (1985) ―Do you really have a global strategy‘, Harvard Business Review, July-
August, 1985. 
2
 Porter, Michael (1990) ―The Competitive of Nations‖, Harvard Business Review, March-April, 1990. 
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Appendix II:  Redefining Counterterrorism-The Terrorist Leader as CEO 
By Bruce Hoffman, Rand Corporation
3
 
 
 
Killing Usama bin Laden will not quash the terrorist threat from al Qaeda, because the group sees the war it 
started as an epic struggle lasting years if not decades. The group has shown itself to have a deeper "bench" 
than was previously thought and to have some form of "corporate succession" plan. In fact, the closest 
organizational relative to al Qaeda is perhaps a private multinational corporation. And bin Laden himself is 
perhaps best viewed as a terrorist CEO. 
 
He has applied business administration and modern management techniques learned both at the university 
and in the family‘s construction business to the running of a transnational terrorist organization. He 
obtained a degree in economics and public administration in 1981 from Saudi Arabia‘s prestigious King 
Abdul Aziz University. He then cut his teeth in the family business, honing the management and 
organizational skills that later enabled him to transform al Qaeda into the world‘s preeminent terrorist 
movement. 
 
He has implemented for al Qaeda the same type of effective organizational framework adopted by many 
corporate executives throughout much of the industrialized world over the past decade. Just as large, 
multinational business conglomerates moved during the 1990s to flatter, networked structures, bin Laden 
did the same with al Qaeda. 
 
He defined a flexible strategy for the group that functions at multiple levels, using both top-down and 
bottom-up approaches. On the one hand, he has functioned like the president or CEO of a large 
multinational corporation by defining specific goals, issuing orders, and ensuring their implementation. 
This function applies mostly to the al Qaeda" spectaculars"—those high-visibility, usually high-value, and 
high-casualty operations like 9/11, the attack on the USS Cole, and the 1998 east Africa embassy bombings. 
 
On the other hand, he has operated as a venture capitalist by soliciting ideas from below, by encouraging 
creative approaches and out-of-the-box thinking, and by providing funding to those proposals he finds 
promising. Several attacks by groups affiliated with al Qaeda attest to this approach. The attacks include 
those staged by Jemaah Islamiyah in Bali in October 2002 and Jakarta in August 2003; by al-Assiriyat al-
Moustaqim in Morocco in May 2003; and by the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front in Turkey in 
November 2003. 
 
Al Qaeda deliberately has no single, set modus operandi—which makes the group all the more resilient and 
formidable. Instead, bin Laden built a movement that actively encourages subsidiary groups fighting under 
the corporate banner to mix and match approaches, employing different tactics and varying means of attack 
and operational styles in a number of locales. 
 
Even in the post 9/11 era, when al Qaeda has been relentlessly tracked, harassed, and weakened, the 
corporate succession plan seems to have functioned. The group appears to retain at least some depth in 
numbers as evidenced by its replenishment abilities to produce successor echelons for the mid-level 
operational commanders who have been killed or captured. 
 
 
                                               
3
 http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2004/ceo.html 
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Appendix III:  Network Structure and Organizational Typology 
 
 In a joint paper presented at the NATO conference on Central Asia last year, we and our colleagues 
argued that in terrorist networks which have a widely distributed structure, like the Al Qaeda allies in 
Indonesia or the Philippines, gains might be made against such organizations by forcing them to “over-
compartment” there operations and their cells, thus limiting the ability of the leadership to propagate 
messages across the “network”.4  We drew largely on the work of Moody and White in constructing a 
social network model of Al-Qaeda as is reproduced below:5   
 
 Moody and White provide an expansion of the social solidarity concept and the understanding of 
linkages between members of a community, the changing interconnections and the impact on node 
connectivity in ―Social Cohesion and Embeddedness‖.6  They argue that the defining characteristic of a 
strongly cohesive group is that ―it has a status beyond any individual group member‖.  The authors define 
structural cohesion as ―the minimum number of actors who, if removed from a group, would disconnect the 
group‖, leading to hierarchically nested groups, where highly cohesive groups are embedded within less 
cohesive groups. Thus, cohesions is an emergent property of the relational pattern that holds a group 
together.  
 As the dynamical process of group development unfolds, typically a weak form of structural cohesion 
begins to emerge as collections of unrelated individuals begin connecting through a single path which 
reflects new relationships. As additional relations form among previously connected pairs of individuals, 
multiple paths through the group develop, increasing the community‘s ability to ―hold together‖.  
 In situations where relations revolve around a leader, the group is often described as ―notoriously 
fragile‖, illustrating the fact that increasing relational volume thru a single individual does not 
necessarily promote cohesiveness . Nevertheless, groups with an all-in-one relational organization such as 
terrorist networks, may be stable and robust to disruptions if “extraordinary efforts” are put into 
maintaining their weak relational structure. The spoke-and-hub configuration of these networks thrives 
on the lack of knowledge that each particular node has about the organization as a whole, a captured or 
destroyed link in the network does not put the organization at risk. The stability of such groups depends on 
the ability to keep the hub hidden, because the hub then becomes the entire group’s fundamental 
structural weakness.  
 Weakly cohesive organizations also promote segmentation into structures that are only minimally 
connected to the rest of the group, leading to schisms and factions. These organizations are also easily 
disrupted by individuals leaving the group. Usually, individuals whose removal would disconnect the 
group are those in control of the flow of resources in the network.  
 On the contrary, collectivities that do not depend on individual actors are less easily segmented. 
These highly cohesive groups benefit form the existence of multiple paths and sets of alternative linkages, 
with no individual or minority within the group exercising control over resources. The ―multiple 
connectivity‖ is thus the essential feature of the strong structurally cohesive organizations.   
 An interesting characteristic of such highly cohesive networks (HCN’s) is that they are characterized 
by a reduction in the power provided by structural holes, such that the ability of any individual to have 
power within the setting is limited as connectivity increases.
7
 For a structurally cohesive group, the 
information transmission increases with each additional independent path in the network, which may infer 
that high connectivity leads to more reliability as information is combined from independent multiple 
sources. ―local pockets of high connectivity‖ can act as ―amplifying substations‖ of information and/or 
                                               
4
  Fellman, Philip V.; Wright, Roxana and Sawyer, David (2003) ―Modeling Terrorist Networks - Complex Systems and First 
Principles of Counter-Intelligence‖, NATO and Central Asia: Enlargement, Civil – Military Relations, and Security Kazach American 
University/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
May 14-16, 2003. 
5
 James Moody, Douglas R. White, ―Social Cohesion and Embeddedness: A Hierarchical Conception of Social Groups, Santa Fe 
Institute Working Papers, 00-08-049, http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/00-08-049.pdf 
6
 James Moody, Douglas R. White, ―Social Cohesion and Embeddedness: A Hierarchical Conception of Social Groups, Santa Fe 
Institute Working Papers, 00-08-049, http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/00-08-049.pdf 
7
 In terms of strategy, destabilizing this kind of network means pressuring the group to increase its recruitment and raise its 
connectivity as opposed to the previously discussed strategy of forced over-compartmentation.  Induced excess connectivity represents 
a different kind of complexity overload. 
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resources. Moody and White relate this operationalization to the actors‘ relative involvement depth in 
social relations, as defined by the concept of embeddedness.:  
 
―If cohesive groups are nested within each other, then each successive group is more deeply embedded within 
the network. As such, one aspect of embeddedness- the depth of involvement in a relational structure- is 
captures by the extent to which a group is nested within the relational structure.‖  
 
 In a companion paper to Moody and White‘s ―Social Cohesion and Embeddedness‖, White and Harary, 
in distinguish between the adhesion concept related to the attractive or charismatic qualities of leaders (or 
attractions to their followers) that create weaker or stronger many-to-one ties or commitments, and the 
cohesion defined by the many-to-many ties among individuals, as they form into clusters.8   The authors 
reiterate the intuitive aspects of the cohesion‘s definition: a group is cohesive to the extent that the social 
relations of its members are resistant to the group being pulled apart, and a group is cohesive to the extent 
that the multiple social relations of its members pull it together. In revisiting the idea that minimal 
cohesion occurs in social networks with a strong group leader or popular figure, White and Harary 
introduce the concept of “adherents” of a social group to specify “the many-to-one commitments of 
individuals to the group itself or to its leadership”.  
 
―What holds the group together where this is the major factor in group solidarity is the strength of adhesion 
of members to the leader, not the cohesiveness of group members in terms of social ties amongst themselves . 
The model of ―adhesion‖ rather than cohesion might apply to the case of a purely vertical bureaucracy where 
there are no lateral ties. ― 
 
 As a general definition, a group is adhesive to the extent that the social relations of its members are 
pairwise-resistant to being pulled apart. 9  Another element of group robustness is the redundancy of 
connections:10 
 
 The level of cohesion is higher when members of a group are connected as opposed to disconnected, and 
further, when the group and its actors are not only connected but also have redundancies in their 
interconnections. The higher the redundancies of independent connections between pairs of nodes, the higher 
the cohesion, and the more social circles in which any pair of persons is contained 
 
 The important consideration for counter-intelligence here is that the higher the level of redundancy, the 
more likely the existence of the group is to be revealed and the easier it is to create a map of social network 
relationships.  A major part of the successful exploitation of this group characteristic is another of the three 
basic counter-intelligence principles—coverage.  Good coverage will yield good observations from which 
good social network maps can be derived.  The caution here, as we have already noted, is like many other 
HUMINT activities, good coverage is not possible to achieve solely by satellite reconnaissance or any other 
national technical means (NTM).  Of course, once target individuals have been identified, dedicated remote 
sensing technology can, in fact, be a very helpful adjunct to the processes of coverage, compartmentation 
and penetration. 
 Again, just as technology cannot substitute for on the ground coverage, effectively covering the broad 
range of terrorist groups in the world today is also not possible with case officer staffing at the 15% level in 
embassies.  It is far less achievable without a highly trained group of multi-lingual, multi-talented 
individuals who are both willing and able to work successfully for extended periods of time in local 
environments as local citizens with no official cover or identifying features as ―foreign‖ nationals (NOC‘s).  
One thing that mid-range analysis tells any intelligent decision maker is that you can have all the science in 
                                               
8
 The Cohesiveness of Blocks in Social Networks: 
Node Connectivity and Conditional Density. Submitted to Sociological Methodology 2001. 
http://www.santafe.edu/files/workshops/dynamics/sm-wh8a.pdf 
9
 The concept of cohesion is formalized through the use of graph theory.  The graph is defined that the  vertices represent the set of 
individuals in the network, and the edges are the relations among actors defined as paired sets. The subsets of nodes that link non-
adjacent vertices will disconnect actors if removed. Any such set of nodes is called an (i, j) cut-set if every path connecting i and j 
passes through at least one node of the set . The ―cut-set resistance to being pulled apart‖ criterion and the multiple independent paths 
―held together‖ criterion of cohesion are formally equivalent in this formal specification.  This kind of graph, if constructed with 
complete information, also provides a predictive mechanism for exactly which nodes need to be removed in order to remove the 
possibility of signals propagating through the system. 
10
 Ibid.  No. 5 
 9 
the world at your finger tips, but without an effective human organization capable of learning and carrying 
out the missions which that science prescribes you are paralyzed.  Remember, the 9/11 hijackers took those 
planes with box-cutters and pocket knives, not AK-47‘s, machine guns, intelligent weapons or recoilless 
rifles and TOW launchers. 
 
 This excerpt highlights the importance of redundancy in distributed organizations.  Given the kind of 
group structure which was used to execute the 9/11 attacks, redundancy suddenly takes on a far more 
significant meaning, indeed it may even be one of the central, defining characteristics of the group. 
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Appendix IV:  Adaptive Dynamics, Coevolution and Complexity Catastrophe 
 
 Another important, recent approach to modeling organizations has come from complexity theory, 
perhaps most clearly explained by Emergence, Complexity and Organization’s founding editor, Michael 
Lissack.11  Where this approach can be used to provide more concrete results is in the dynamic fitness 
landscape model developed originally by Sewall Wright in the 1930’s and subsequently revived and greatly 
expanded by Stuart Kauffman.12  Bill McKelvey has done a very precise study using statistical mechanics to 
decompose Michael Porter’s value chain of a firms activities into scalar values which can then be plotted 
against the values of rivals.  In a paper given at the 2004 International Conference on Complex Systems, 
several of us presented papers which examined a variety of organizations using Kauffman’s model.13  In 
describing Bill McKelvey’s approach, which bears very strongly on counter-terrorism methods like forced 
overcompartmentation, we noted: 
 
 While the concept of the fitness landscape is not new 14  Kauffman was the first to place fitness 
landscapes in a dynamic setting using Boolean networks.15  Kauffman explains rugged fitness landscapes as 
a natural outcome of adaptive evolution:16 
 
 Adaptive evolution occurs largely by the successive accumulation of minor variations in phenotype.  The 
simple example of computer programs makes it clear that not all complex systems are graced with the property 
that a minor change in systemic structure typically leads to minor changes in system behavior.  In short, as their 
internal structure is modified, some systems change behavior relatively smoothly and some relatively radically.  
Thus we confront the question of whether selective evolution is able to ―tune‖ the structure of complex systems 
so that they evolve readily. 
 
The mechanism by which biological systems tune is the result of standard statistical mechanics, whereby 
ensembles move randomly through all phase spaces of the system over time.  With respect to the random 
array of ensemble positions, we might think of economic or business systems which occupy nearby 
positions in a large market with many securities (a ―densely packed‖ state space).  Borrowing from random 
walk theory we could view the ability of a security to earn economic returns as the measure of its fitness.  
While this is a very simple metaphor it helps to tie the conceptual foundations of economics and finance to 
evolutionary biology in the sense that the elements of both systems can rest in peaks or valleys (in finance 
this would be equivalent to Jensen‘s α , which represents the degree to which management (and by logical 
inference, corporate structure) either creates or destroys value in a firm.  The peaks can be either local 
maxima or global maxima.  In highly efficient markets stocks would reach their equilibrium prices rather 
rapidly and the fitness landscape would be highly correlated.17 
 In less efficient markets, for example markets like the long distance commodities trades we frequently 
see in international business, where there are significant information asymmetries and market inefficiencies, 
the landscape would tend to be ―rugged‖ and  multi-peaked.  In such a situation, there are opportunities for 
large arbitrage (similar to the biologist‘s ―punctuated equilibrium‖). 18   In the context of a dynamic 
landscape 19  where multiple entities interact and both their presence and their interactions affect the 
structure of the landscape, Kauffman argues:20 
                                               
11
 Lissack, Michael, (1996)  "Chaos and Complexity: What Does That Have to Do with Knowledge Management?", in Knowledge 
Management: Organization, Competence and Methodology, ed. J. F. Schreinemakers, Ergon Verlog 1: 62-81 (Wurzburg: 1996) 
12
 Kauffman, Stuart (1993), The Origins of Order, Oxford University Press (Oxford and New York: 1993) 
13
 Fellman, Philip V.; Wright, Roxana; Post, Jonathan Vos; and Dasari, Usha (2004), ―Adaptation and Coevolution on an Emergent  
Global Competitive Landscape‖, paper presented at the International Conference on Complex Systems, Boston, May 16-21, 2004. 
14
 Wright, S. (A) ―Evolution in Mendelian populations‖, Genetics, 16 97–159, 1931. (B)  ―The roles of mutation, inbreeding, 
crossbreeding and selection in evolution‖, .Proceedings Sixth International Congress on Genetics 1 356–366 (1932) 
15
 Kauffman, S. A. (1969) Metabolic Stability and Epigenesis in Randomly Constructed Genetic Nets. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 
22, pp. 437-467. 
16
 Ibid. No. 6 
17
 For a more complete description see Smith, Eric; Farmer, J. Doyne; Gillemot, Laszlo; and Krishnamurthy, Supriya ―Statistical 
Theory of the Continuous Double Auction‖, Santa Fe Institute Working Papers, October 20, 2002 
http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/02-10-057.pdf 
18
 See Aoki, Masahiko, Subjective Game Models and the Mechanism of Institutional Change, Santa Fe Institute Workshop, 
http://www.santafe.edu/files/workshops/bowles/aokiIX.PDF 
19
 Those unfamiliar with the mechanics of Boolean networks can obtain a very simple, straightforward explanation with examples 
from Torsten Reil‘s ―An Introduction to Complex Systems‖, Department of Zoology, Oxford University at 
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 The character of adaptive evolution depends on the structure of such fitness landscapes.  Most critically, 
we shall find that, as the complexity of the system under selection increases, selection is progressively less able 
to alter the properties of the system.  Thus, even in the presence of continuing selection, complex systems tend 
to remain typical members of the ensemble of possibilities from which they are drawn…Thus, if selection, 
when operating on complex systems which spontaneously exhibit profound order, is unable to avoid that 
spontaneous order, that order will shine through.  In short, this theme, central to our concerns, states that much 
of the order in organisms may be spontaneous.  Rather than reflecting selection‘s successes, such order may, 
remarkably reflect selection‘s failure. 
 
Two important points follow from Kauffman‘s model.  The first is that economic theories  particularly 
equilibrium-oriented theories which model performance as the outcome of selection may have built their 
structure on an internally contradictory foundation from the ground up. 21   The second point is more 
technical and has to do with some of the formal mathematical properties NK Boolean networks as well as 
the mathematical limitations that coevolving populations impose on fitness landscapes.  Kauffman‘s model 
treats adaptive evolution as a search process.22 
 
 Adaptive evolution is a search process—driven by mutation, recombination and selection—on fixed or 
deforming fitness landscapes, An adapting population flows over the landscape under these forces.  The 
structure of such landscapes, smooth or rugged, governs both the evolvability of populations and the sustained 
fitness of their members.  The structure of fitness landscapes inevitably imposes limitations on adaptive search.  
On smooth landscapes and a fixed population size and mutation rate, as the complexity of the entities under 
selection increases an error threshold is reached…the population ―melts‖ from the adaptive peaks and flows 
across vast reaches of genotype space among near neutral mutants.  Conversely on sufficiently rugged 
landscapes, the evolutionary process becomes trapped in very small regions of genotype space…the results of 
this chapter suffice to say that selection can be unable to avoid spontaneous order.  The limitations on selection 
arise because of two inexorable complexity catastrophes…each arises where the other does not.  One on rugged 
landscapes, trapping adaptive walks, the other on smooth landscapes where selection becomes too weak to hold 
adapting populations in small untypical regions of the space of possibilities.  Between them, selection is sorely 
pressed to escape the typical features of the system on which it operates. 
 
 Kauffman covers a great deal of ground here, not all of which can be fully recapitulated in a brief 
paper.  Again, Kauffman‘s Type II complexity catastrophe (which takes place on smooth or highly 
correlated landscapes) bears a strong resemblance to what Farmer describes as ―first order efficiency‖ in 
financial markets with very thin arbitrage margins for technical traders.23  To earn ―extraordinary returns‖ 
traders are forced to undertake ―wide searches‖, equivalent to highly leveraged positions. 
 Kauffman‘s Type I complexity catastrophe is the result of the fundamental structure of NK Boolean 
fitness landscapes.  In a dynamic fitness landscape, as complexity increases, the heights of accessible peaks 
fall towards mean fitness. Again, in terms of financial markets we might compare this to the fact that over 
long periods of time the betas of all stocks in the market have a tendency to drift towards 1.24 
 Bill McKelvey takes the fitness landscape model well past being a metaphor for market evolution and 
decomposes Michael Porter‘s value chain into value chain competencies as the parts of firms (the N of the 
NK network) and K as the connections of between the parts within a firm and the parts of the opponents.  
He models firm behavior using a heterogeneous25 stochastic microagent assumption, which then allows him 
                                                                                                                                            
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~quee0818/complexity/complexity.html Vladimir Redko provides a slightly more mathematical treatment at 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/BOOLNETW.html 
20
 Ibid. No. 6 
21
 See, for example, Reaume, David ―Walras, complexity, and Post Walrasian Macroeconomics,‖ Collander David, Ed. Beyond 
Microfoundations: Post Walrasian Macroeconomics, Cambridge University Press 1996 
22
 The search property of organisms seeking maximal fitness levels allows one to draw some additional, strong conclusions about both 
organisms and landscapes. 
23
 Ibid. No. 12, See also Zovko, Ilija and Farmer, J. Doyne, ―The Power of Patience: A behavioral regularity in limit order placement‖, 
Santa Fe Institute Working Papers, 02-06-27; Daniels, Marcus J.; Iori, Giulia; and Farmer, J. Doyne, ―Demand Storage, Liquidity, and 
Price Volatility‖ Santa Fe Institute Working Papers, 02-01-001; and Farmer, J. Doyne and Joshi, Shareen, ―The Price Dynamics of 
Common Trading Strategies‖, in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization October 30, 2001. 
24
 See Theobald, Michael and Yallup, Peter  ―Determining the Security Speed of Adjustment Coefficients‖, 
http://bss2.bham.ac.uk/business/papers/Theocoeff.pdf , May 2001.  See also Blake, David; Lehmann, Bruce N. and Timmerman, Allan 
―Asset Allocation Dynamics and Pension Fund Performance‖, November, 1998 
http://econ.ucsd.edu/~atimmerm/pensrev2.pdf 
25
 See (A) Farmer, J. Doyne ―Physicists Attempt to Climb the Ivory Towers of Finance‖, Computing in Science and Engineering, 
November-December, 1999 for an explanation of agent-based models.  See also W. Brian Arthur‘s classic game theoretic treatment of 
an interaction of agents which has no equilibrium and no possibility of satisfying every player either prospectively or retrospectively, 
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to test four basic concepts: ―(1) What intrafirm levels of integrative complexity affect competitive 
advantage? (2) What levels of integrative complexity influence how rapidly firms in coevolutionary groups 
reach equilibrium fitness levels, if they do so? (3) What complexity factors might affect the competitive 
advantage (or height) of fitness levels? and (4) What levels of integrative complexity might affect the 
overall adaptive success of firms comprising a coevolving system?
26
 
 The formal structure of McKelvey‘s question is every bit as important as the answers, some of which 
are provided in his work and some which are explained by the Windrum-Birchenhall model of 
technological diffusion which we discuss next.  McKelvey‘s work serves two important purposes.  First, he 
develops a metric from Porter‘s value chain which allows him to calculate actual scalar or vector values for 
different NK structures.  This also allows him to calculate fitness levels in terms of Nash Equilibria which 
vary directly as a function of N and K.27  Secondly, the values he derives from Porter‘s value chain allow 
him to run simulations which specify under what conditions firms should either increase or decrease their 
internal and external connectivity.  While in many ways McKelvey is really just taking the first cut at the 
problem, he is doing so with rigorous statistical mechanics, so that even where his conclusions are not 
immediately overwhelming, they are profoundly accurate.  Even though we might not expect most firms to 
start using Kauffman‘s model in the immediate future (Kauffman did run a joint venture with Ernst and 
Young for several years, during which his primary purpose was to organize conferences and explain to 
clients the value and insights of his model)28 McKelvey‘s advice, In general the simulations indicate that 
keeping one’s internal and external coevolutionary interdependencies just below that of opponents can 
be expected to hold true for quite some time. 
 From our perspective, as we see terrorist organizations evolve over time to become increasingly 
sophisticated, we might consider two relevant results from McKelvey‘s research.  First, counter-terrorist 
organizations can become so highly compartmented that the suffer diseconomies of scope.  One has merely 
to think of the ultra secret, NSA Decrypt vault run at TRW, as portrayed in the film ―The Falcon and the 
                                                                                                                                            
the El Farol Bar Game, in (B) "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality", American Economic Review, May 1994, Vol. 84, No. 
2, pp. 406-411. Arthur also deals with the stochastic microagent assumption in(C) Arthur, W. Brian, "Learning and Adaptive 
Economic Behavior: Designing Economic Agents that Act Like Human Agents: A Behavioral Approach to Bounded Rationality", 
American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, May 1991, pp. 353-359. 
26
 McKelvey, Bill ―Avoiding Complexity Catastrophe in Coevolutionary Pockets: Strategies for Rugged Landscapes‖, Organization 
Science, Vol. 10, No. 3, May–June 1999.  McKelvey explains his use of Kauffman‘s model by noting that ―The biologist Stuart 
Kauffman suggests a theory of complexity catastrophe offering universal principles explaining phenomena normally attributed to 
Darwinian natural selection theory. Kauffman‘s complexity theory seems to apply equally well to firms in coevolutionary  
pockets. Based on complexity theory, four kinds of complexity are identified. Kauffman‘s ―NK[C] model‖ is positioned ―at the edge 
of chaos‖ between complexity driven by ―Newtonian‖ simple rules and rule driven deterministic chaos. Kauffman‘s insight, which is 
the basis of the findings in this paper, is that complexity is both a consequence and a cause. Multicoevolutionary complexity in firms 
is defined by moving natural selection processes inside firms and down to a ―parts‖ level of analysis, in this instance Porte r‘s value 
chain level, to focus on microstate activities by agents. 
27
 Ibid., ―Kauffman argues that his ―NK[C] Boolean game‖ model behaves like Boolean networks when agent outcomes are limited to 
0 or 1, the K number of interdependencies is taken as the number of inputs, and Nash equilibria in N person games are taken as 
equivalent to agents being trapped on local optima. In the NK Boolean game, fitness yields are assigned to the 0 or 1 actions by 
drawing from a uniform distribution ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. The K epistatic interdependencies that inhibit fitness yields from an 
agent‘s actions are drawn from a fitness table in which fitness levels of each ―one-change‖ nearest neighbor are assigned by drawing 
from a uniform distribution also ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. Kauffman points out that the complexity tuning effect occurs when 
increasing K reduces the height of local optima while also increasing their number. Thus, high K leads to complexity catastrophe.  In 
describing how K and C effects enter into the model, Kauffman says: 
. . . [F]or each of the N traits in species 2, the model will assign a random fitness between 0.0 and 1.0 for each combination of the K 
traits internal to species 2, together with all combinations of C traits in species 1. In short, we expand the random fitness table for each 
trait in species 2 such that the trait looks at its K internal epistatic inputs and also at the C external epistatic inputs from species 1 
(Kauffman 1993, p. 244). 
One might conclude from this that K and C are combined into one overall moderating effect on the fitness yield from an agent‘s 
choice to adopt a higher fitness from a nearest-neighbor. Results of the models indicate otherwise. 
 As Kauffman points out (pp. 249, 254), the speed at which agents encounter Nash equilibria increases with K, and decreases as 
C and S increase. Thus, in these models K acts as a complexity ―forcing‖ effect in speeding up the process of reaching stable Nash 
equilibria, whereas C acts as an ―antiforcing‖ effect, as does S. Presumably K effects are averaged as per the basic NK model, leaving 
C and S effects (S multiplies the C effects) to modify fitness yields on an agent‘s actions independently of K effects. The consequence 
is that increasing K tunes the landscape toward more ruggedness (increased numbers of less fit local optima), and increases the 
likelihood of agents being marooned on local optima. But increasing C and/or S prevents achieving Nash equilibrium by prolonging 
the ―coupled dancing,‖ as Kauffman (1993, p. 243) calls it, in which opponents keep altering each other‘s landscapes, keep the fitness 
search going, and thereby prevent stability—the more opponents there are, the more the instability persists. 
28
 See Meyer, Chris ―What‘s Under the Hood: A Layman‘s Guide to the Real Science‖, Ernst and Young/Cap Gemini Center for 
Business Innovation, http://www.cbi.cgey.com/events/pubconf/1996-07-19/proceedings/chapter%2010.pdf 
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Snowman‖29 (based upon a true story chronicled by Robert Lindsey30) where the document shredder was 
primarily used to mix ―Margaritas‖.  Bureaucracy has many dysfunctional forms, and historical evidence 
suggests that a certain degree of ―lean-ness‖ may serve better than a massive bureaucratic structure.31   
 By the same token, a basic policy recommendation should be that once we can get an accurate picture 
of a terrorist network
32
 it might well be more useful to force an organization to ―load up‖ (i.e., demand 
more funding, consume more resources, etc.) in order to bring about the kind of breakdown which 
McKelvey characterizes as a complexity catastrophe.  Additional work by Carley et al, has examined the 
impact or cognitive load, and as a corollary, cognitive overload as a mechanism for impeding the 
functioning of terrorist networks.33 
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 See Knott, Jack and Miller, Gary (1988) Reforming Bureaucracy, Prentice-Hall (Englewood Cliffs: 1988). 
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 See Carley, Kathleen; Lee, Ju-Sung and Krackhardt, David (2001), ―Destabilizing Networks‖, CONNECTIONS 24(3): 31-34 © 
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